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Abstract
We study the quality choices of institutional health-care providers, such as hospitals,
assuming that the utility function of the key organizational decision-maker includes
both quality of care and ﬁnancial surplus. An increase in the decision-maker’s rate of
surplus retention leads to a decrease (increase) in quality if his coeﬃcient of relative
risk aversion is less than (greater than) 1, as is likely when the decision-maker faces
prosperous (diﬃcult) ﬁnancial conditions. Such behavior is consistent with “target
income behavior,” where the target income is surplus suﬃcient to break even. An
increase in productive eﬃciency always leads the provider to increase quality.
∗Eggleston, Department of Economics, Tufts University; Miller, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard
University; Zeckhauser, Kennedy School of Government and Visiting Professor at Harvard Business School.1 Introduction
An extensive literature examines the objectives of those who provide health care, including
hospitals, and HMOs and other insurers, not only physicians (Newhouse 1970; Pauly 1987;
Sloan 2000). Most analyses posit that providers are primarily concerned with the quality
of care they provide, and their ﬁnancial returns. Quality of care can be interpreted broadly
to include such concepts as access, principally for the poor, and scale of operation.1 Some
formulations posit one or the other of these variables as the principal objective, with the other
serving as a constraint. Other analyses impose constraints on one or both variables, but posit
a range where unconstrained optimization applies. Much of the discussion in the literature
relates to the disparity or similarity in objective functions across diﬀerent ownership types,
e.g., for-proﬁt, nonproﬁt, and government.
We focus on institutional health-care providers, such as hospitals and nursing homes,
rather than individual providers, such as doctors or nurses. Our analysis assumes that the
utility function of the key organizational decision-maker, such as a hospital or health plan
CEO, includes both quality of care and ﬁnancial surplus. Thus, our approach is consistent
with Hart and Holmstrom’s (2002) theory of ﬁrm scope, which emphasizes the importance of
managers’ private beneﬁts and internalizing noncontractible decisions. Our model features a
speciﬁcf o r mo fp r i v a t eb e n e ﬁts: utility from quality. This “private beneﬁt” could stem from
innate concern for patients, social and professional norms, or value from being attached to
1The Institute of Medicine deﬁnes quality as “the degree to which health services for individuals and
populations increase the likelihood of desired health outcomes and are consistent with current professional
knowledge” (IOM 2001, p.232).
1a ﬁrm with a reputation for high-quality health care.
We investigate the consequences for quality when the decision-maker’s rate of ﬁnancial
surplus retention increases. If, for example, the provider reduces its “organizational slack,”
secures better terms from its workers, suppliers, or grantors, or (at a for-proﬁt provider)
secures a larger bonus incentive or equity interest, its rate of surplus retention increases.
How will the provider’s choice of quality change in response? Understanding the answer to
this question is critical for policymakers seeking to spur quality improvement. How will a
provider — a nursing home, behavioral health carve-out, etc. — change quality in response
to an increase in percentage fee? Will a nursing home chain that sells a signiﬁcant equity
stake, thus retaining less of any given surplus, have an incentive to change the quality of the
personnel it hires and the facilities it maintains? To what extent will reducing tax rates
merely increase proﬁts of providers who pay taxes, or change their incentives to invest in
quality enhancement?
We ﬁnd that an increase in surplus retention produces two countervailing eﬀects. First, it
increases the decision-maker’s surplus, holding quality constant. In response, the decision-
maker spends some of the additional surplus to increase quality. We call this the wealth
eﬀect, a term from consumer theory. Second, an increase in surplus retention increases the
rate at which the decision maker’s surplus must be sacriﬁced in order to increase quality.
This leads the decision-maker to decrease quality. Again, drawing on consumer theory, we
call this the substitution eﬀect.
Which eﬀect dominates depends on the decision-maker’s level of relative risk aversion.
We will show that if the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion is less than one, then an increase
2in surplus retention leads to a decrease in quality; however, an increase in surplus retention
leads to an increase in quality if the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion exceeds 1. If the
decision-maker exhibits decreasing relative risk aversion as his wealth increases (i.e., he
becomes less risk averse with respect to gambles proportional to wealth), then in “ﬂush
times” the substitution eﬀect will dominate, and quality will likely decrease with surplus
retention. In “hard times,” when wealth eﬀects are more important, quality will rise with
surplus retention.
Strong wealth eﬀects imply a kind of organizational “target income behavior,” where the
decision-maker strives to achieve a speciﬁed target income. We illustrate the connection
between our main result and target income behavior by examining a model in which the
decision-maker faces an explicit breakeven constraint. We also show that while an increase
in surplus retention may decrease quality, an increase in productive eﬃciency always leads
the provider to increase quality.
Probably the most closely related work is McGuire and Pauly (1991), which we discuss
below. They focus on supplier-induced demand and overprovision under fee-for-service pay-
m e n t ;w ef o c u so nt h ep r o v i d e r ’ si n c e n t i v et os t i n to nq u a l i t y ,t h ep e r v a s i v ec o n c e r nu n d e r
prospective payment, capitation, or other forms of “supply-side cost sharing” (Ellis and
McGuire 1990; Newhouse 2002). Like McGuire and Pauly, we use a representative agent’s
utility function, but we are concerned with agency problems of corporate governance, rather
than an individual physician’s labor-leisure trade-oﬀ.
In the remainder of this paper, we ﬁrst present the model and analysis, developing two key
propositions. We then brieﬂy discuss their relationship to organizational slack, productive
3eﬃciency, competition, innovation, and the ownership structures of health care provider
organizations.
2 The Model and Analysis
Consider a provider organization with a central decision-maker who values both quality
provided to patients and retained surplus (proﬁt). The provider is paid at least partially
prospectively. Examples are a hospital under the Prospective Payment System (PPS) or a
capitated managed care plan.
Let q denote quality above some minimum contractible level, s(q) denote the per-patient
surplus when quality is q,a n du(w) be the decision-maker’s utility function for money.
Functions s(q) and u(w) a r ea s s u m e dt ob et w i c ed i ﬀerentiable, with s(0) > 0 (i.e., at the
minimum contractible quality, q =0 , per-patient surplus is positive), s00 (q) < 0, u0 (w) > 0
and u00 (w) < 0. Although the provider may be rewarded with higher surplus for quality
above the minimum, eventually the provider faces a trade-oﬀ between quality and proﬁt,
i.e., s0 (q) < 0 for suﬃciently large q. This assumption, which implies some supply-side cost
sharing at the margin, distinguishes the model from that of McGuire and Pauly (1991),
who focus on a physician’s incentive to induce demand under fee-for-service payment, where
surplus always increases with volume.2 In the McGuire-Pauly model, a provider’s concern
for her patients is reﬂected in a disutility from inducing excessive volume. By contrast, our
provider’s concern for patients takes the form of boosting quality despite a loss in surplus
2See McGuire (2000) for a discussion of physician agency and empirical evidence on supplier-induced
demand, one form of “supply-side moral hazard” (e.g. Newhouse 2002, pp.81-83).
4from doing so.
The provider’s utility function is additively separable in quality and retained surplus, y,
and takes the form:
v(q,y)=q + u(y),( 1 )
where quality is normalized so that utility is linear in q. Our independent variable is
b ∈ (0,1), the fraction of surplus retained by the provider. Retained surplus is therefore




s.t. y ≤ bs(q).
Since v(q,y) is strictly quasiconcave in quality and the constraint set is strictly convex, (PP)
has a unique solution, which we denote (q∗,y∗). Throughout the paper we assume that q∗
and y∗ are strictly positive and ﬁnite.
Figure 1 illustrates the provider’s quality choice for a given rate of surplus retention, b.
Curve y = bs(q), the constraint from (PP), can be thought of as the production possibility
frontier for transforming quality into retained surplus and vice-versa. The dashed lines
represents the provider’s utility isoquants. Solving (PP) given b leads the provider to choose
point (q∗,y ∗), where the utility isoquant is tangent to the constraint, y = bs(q).T h u s ,
although similar, our problem diﬀers from the standard optimization problem from consumer
theory in that, in our case, the budget set is nonlinear.
As is illustrated in Figure 1, since utility is strictly increasing in each of its arguments,
the constraint must bind at the optimum, and y∗ = bs(q∗). Noting this, the provider’s
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Figure 1: The Provider’s Problem.
6maximization problem is equivalent to choosing q to maximize:
q + u(bs(q)). (2)





∗)) = −1.( 3 )
Note that since b>0 and u0 > 0, it must be that s0 (q∗) < 0. That is, the optimizing
decision-maker provides more quality than he would if he only cared about surplus.







The left-hand side of (4) represents the marginal utility of increasing retained surplus. The
right-hand side represents the magnitude of the loss in utility from the decrease in quality
that accompanies the increase in retained surplus. To see this, let h(y) be the quality
provided when retained surplus is y,i . e . ,h(bs(q)) = q. Since utility v is linear in quality
q, h(y) is measured in units of utility. Diﬀerentiating, dh
dybs0 (q)=1 ,o rdh
dy = 1
bs0(q) when
q = h(y). Thus, the provider chooses a level of quality to equate the marginal utility of
additional surplus with the marginal disutility of the quality reduction it entails.
Conditions (3) and (4) highlight the countervailing roles played by quality in the provider’s
objective function. Increasing quality increases the provider’s utility, but eventually de-
creases the provider’s retained surplus. At the optimum, the provider balances the marginal
contributions of these two eﬀects on utility.
Our main objective is to determine how a change in surplus retention rate aﬀects the
provider’s quality choice. When the provider’s rate of surplus retention increases, there are
7two eﬀects, analogous to the wealth and substitution eﬀects of standard consumer theory
(explained more fully below). First, if quality is held constant, retained surplus increases,
which eﬀectively makes the decision maker “wealthier,” and tends to increase the provider’s
quality choice. Second, at the margin, the provider must sacriﬁce more surplus to increase
quality, which leads the provider to choose a lower level of quality. This is analogous to
consumer theory’s substitution eﬀect. In this model, the wealth and substitution eﬀects
oppose each other. Proposition 1 describes the overall eﬀect of an increase in surplus
retention on quality, which depends on the decision-maker’s level of relative risk aversion.
Since bs(q) is the provider’s retained surplus, the decision-maker’s Arrow-Pratt coeﬃcient
of relative risk aversion is given by ρ = −bs(q)
u00(bs(q))
u0(bs(q)).
Proposition 1 If ρ > 1, then an increase in surplus retention leads to an increase in quality.
If ρ =1 , then quality is unaﬀected by an increase in surplus retention. If ρ < 1,t h e na n
increase in surplus retention leads to a decrease in quality.
Proof. Denoting the dependence of q∗ on b by q(b), substituting q(b) into (3), and totally
diﬀerentiating with respect to b yields the following expression for
dq
db, the response of q∗ to a



















s0 (q(b))(ρ − 1)
bs00 (q(b))u0 (bs(q(b))) − u00(bs(q(b)))(bs0 (q(b)))
2. (6)
By concavity, the denominator of the expression on the right hand side of (6) is negative.
Since s0 (q(b)) < 0, the sign of
dq
db is the same as that of ρ − 1.
8Figure 2 illustrates how an increase in the surplus retention rate aﬀects the provider’s
quality choice. For the moment, we set aside the role of risk aversion. The dashed lines
labeled v0, v1,a n dv2 represent the provider’s utility isoquants.3 Initially, the provider
retains fraction b0 of his surplus and chooses point A, where the utility isoquant is tangent
to the constraint y = b0s(q), as in Figure 1 above. Following an increase in the surplus
retention rate from b0 to b1,t h ep r o v i d e rc h o o s e sp o i n tC, where his utility isoquant is
tangent to the new constraint, y = b1s(q).
Figure 2 decomposes the provider’s quality adjustment into two parts, the substitution
eﬀect and the wealth eﬀect. First, to identify the substitution eﬀect, we isolate the impact of
the change in b on the slope of the constraint. The curve labeled s∗ (q) is derived by shifting
y = b1s(q) downward until it goes through point A. Since the provider can still choose
point A, changing the constraint from y = b0s(q) to y = s∗ (q) represents a “compensated”
change in b which holds the provider’s “purchasing” power constant, allowing us to isolate
the substitution and wealth eﬀects.4 Following the compensated change in b, the provider
maximizes utility subject to the constraint that y = s∗ (q). The solution to the provider’s
problem is labeled B.S i n c e s∗ (q) is steeper than b0s(q) through point A, the provider
reacts to the increase in b, which is analogous to an increase in the relative price of quality,
3Since utility is quasilinear in quality, each utility isoquant is a “horizontal translation” of any other.
Therefore, holding retained surplus constant, the slopes of the utility isoquant do not change as quality
increases.
4Mathematically, s∗ (q) is the new constraint shifted downward by the change in retained surplus when
quality is held constant at the level of point A.T h a t i s , l e t A =( qA,y A). Then, s∗ (q)=b1s(q) −
s(qA)(b1 − b0).
9by substituting toward surplus and away from quality. Thus quality is necessarily lower at
point B than at point A — the substitution eﬀect (on quality) is always negative.
We next turn to the wealth eﬀect.5 Increasing b also makes the provider “wealthier.”
Taking the substitution eﬀect as ﬁxed, this shifts the constraint from s∗ (q) to b1s(q). The
provider responds to this increase in purchasing power by increasing quality.6
Whether a provider increases or decreases quality when her surplus retention rate rises
depends on which eﬀect—substitution or wealth—is stronger. As Proposition 1 states, this is
determined by the provider’s relative risk aversion. To get a feel for the intuition, consider
a risk neutral provider. In this case, the provider’s utility isoquants are linear. Therefore,
since s∗ (q) is a vertical translation of b1s(q),p o i n tC must lie directly above point B, i.e.,
there is no wealth eﬀect. However, the substitution eﬀect persists, and therefore an increase
in b leads the provider to decrease quality. When the provider is risk averse but only slightly
so (i.e., ρ < 1), the wealth eﬀect is positive, but the substitution eﬀect continues to dominate,
and increasing b decreases quality.
At the other extreme, when the provider is very risk averse, a small increase in surplus
signiﬁcantly reduces the marginal utility of surplus. It is as if the provider’s utility isoquant
through point A bends at nearly a right angle. In this case, the substitution eﬀect is
very small, whereas the wealth eﬀect remains large. Thus, when the provider is very risk
5The analogy to the wealth eﬀect of neoclassical consumer theory is not exact: the budget set here is
nonlinear and the increase in b induces an upward shift in the constraint (rather than a radial expansion).
Nevertheless, our wealth eﬀect is the natural extension of the neoclassical concept to our more general
environment, and so we maintain the name.
6The Appendix provides an argument for why the wealth eﬀe c tm u s tb ep o s i t i v e .





y = b0s(q) 
y = b1s(q) 
 y = s*(q) 




Figure 2: The Substitution and Wealth Eﬀects.
11averse, the wealth eﬀect dominates and the increase in b leads to an increase in quality. By
extension, the wealth eﬀect continues to dominate whenever the provider is suﬃciently risk
averse (i.e., ρ > 1).
2.1 Breakeven Concerns and Target Income Behavior
Frequently, decision makers, whether in for-proﬁto rn o n p r o ﬁt organizations, are faced with
the need to achieve a certain critical level of surplus. If the decision maker is unable to
achieve this goal, he will be assessed a large penalty. For example, a ﬁrm that cannot
break even over the long run will go out of business; a nonproﬁt reaping red ink may lose
contributions and enter a death spiral; a decision-maker who incurs large losses may risk
dismissal. When such a decision maker faces some residual risk (perhaps exogenous to the
decision at hand), the possibility that surplus will be low enough to trigger the penalty will
have the eﬀect of increasing the decision maker’s eﬀective risk aversion. *** working on a
reference here *** In light of this, Proposition 1 suggests that providers facing tough ﬁnancial
times will respond to an increase in their surplus retention rate by increasing quality, while
those experiencing good times will respond to the increase by decreasing quality.
In a diﬀerent context, McGuire and Pauly (1991) present ﬁndings similar to ours. In a
model that focuses on physicians’ responses to fee changes, they show that when a provider
is very risk averse and income eﬀects are strong, the provider will tend to display “target
income” behavior. The importance of this motive depends on the provider’s level of relative
risk aversion. In a footnote, they observe “the condition for the supply curve to be backward
bending involves the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion... The supply curve is negatively
12sloped if and only if the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion exceeds one” (p.393).
In the extreme, if the decision-maker faces a very large penalty if he fails to achieve some
target income, he will behave as if he actually faces a breakeven constraint. The predictions
of our model are consistent with the behavior that arises in this limiting case. To illustrate,
consider a simpliﬁed version of our model. We let s(q)=r − c(q),w h e r er is a ﬁxed
reimbursement, c0 (q) > 0,a n dc00 (q) > 0. The provider is risk neutral with utility function:
v = q + b(r − c(q)),
and faces breakeven constraint b(r − c(q)) ≥ f,w h e r ef>0 represents the target income,
the surplus required to break even.7












which agrees with Proposition 1. For a risk-neutral provider in relatively good times (i.e.,
when the breakeven constraint does not bind), an increase in b leads to a decrease in q.










7The results continue to hold if the provider is risk averse.
13Hence, when times are diﬃcult enough that the breakeven constraint binds, the provider
responds to an increase in b by increasing q. This stands to reason, since the constraint only
binds when the provider would like to increase quality but cannot do so and still break even.
An increase in b relaxes the constraint and allows the provider to choose higher quality.
2.2 Productive Eﬃciency vs. Surplus Retention
An increase in the provider’s surplus retention rate can be thought of as a type of eﬃciency
gain (e.g., a reduction in “organizational slack,” discussed below). However, not all eﬃciency
gains lead to the type of behavior described in Proposition 1. For example, a ﬁrm’s behavior
following an increase in productive eﬃciency, i.e., a downward shift in the cost curve, does
not meet the conditions of Proposition 1. To illustrate, consider the case where s(q)=
r(q) − kc(q),w h e r ek>0 is a parameter whose decrease represents a gain in productive
eﬃciency, and c(q) is the strictly positive, strictly increasing, and strictly convex cost of
producing quality. The provider’s utility function is:
v = q + u(b(r(q) − kc(q))).
Proposition 2 An increase in productive eﬃciency (i.e., a decrease in k)a l w a y sl e a d st h e
provider to increase quality.













bu0 (w∗)c0 (q(k)) + b2 (r0 (q(k)) − kc0 (q(k)))u00(w∗)c(q(k))







where w∗ = b(r(q∗) − kc(q∗)). The Proposition follows from 7, noting that an increase in
productive eﬃciency corresponds to a decrease in k.
In Proposition 2, an increase in productive eﬃciency leads to an increase in quality
because the wealth and substitution eﬀects go in the same direction. A decrease in k
increases retained surplus, which induces the provider to increase quality in order to restore
optimality. Thus the wealth eﬀect is positive. A decrease in k also decreases the marginal
cost of quality, making quality “less expensive” relative to surplus and inducing the provider
once again to increase quality to restore optimality. Thus the substitution eﬀect is positive
as well, and, unequivocally, the provider responds to a downward shift in its (marginal) cost
curve by increasing quality.8
It is also straightforward to conﬁrm that the provider responds to an increase in per-
patient revenue r by increasing quality (Ma 1994). That is, if v = q + u(tr − c(q)),t h e n
dq∗
dt > 0. Hence, the possibility that increasing surplus retention increases quality highlighted
in Proposition 1 arises from the fact that an increase in surplus retention increases the
provider’s cost, eﬀectively increasing supply-side cost sharing.
8This is because a decrease in k decreases both total cost and marginal cost. If the productive eﬃciency
change entailed larger total cost but lower marginal cost over the relevant range, then the wealth and
substitution eﬀects would once again oppose each other.
153D i s c u s s i o n
Decision-makers subject to a breakeven constraint become very risk averse as the constraint
comes closer to binding. Hence, we should expect providers facing tough economic times
to behave in a very risk averse manner, while those enjoying good times should be less risk
averse. Hence, Proposition 1 implies that in good times, surplus retention and quality move
in opposite directions, while in bad times they move together.
It has long been observed that health care providers, like many entities that operate in
a sector with many subsidized participants — most signiﬁcantly nonproﬁts and government
providers — enjoy (or suﬀer) from organizational slack (Cyert and March 1956 and 1963),
particularly in good times or less competitive contexts.9 That is, they provide a service at
higher cost than the most eﬃcient providers do. Alexander and Bloom (1987) reﬂect the
conventional view in stating that “slack resources are greater among hospitals that by law
cannot distribute their excess revenue as proﬁts to external actors such as stockholders”
(p.62; see also Duizendstraal and Nentjes 1994).
One explanation is that organizations that give or sell inputs to the provider may “tax”
the provider on any surplus. We label such organizations “purveyors.” Purveyors include
suppliers price discriminating so as to maximize their proﬁts, federal and local governments
oﬀering subsidies, and employees in a normal bargaining relationship, who can extract some
of their employers’ surplus. Purveyors will pro v i d el e s so rc h a r g em o r ew h e nt h eo r g a n i z a t i o n
9“The allocation of organizational resources to the satisfaction of subunits in excess of the minimum
required for maintenance of the system gives rise to a form of organizational slack” (Cyert and March 1956,
p.46).
16is ﬂush with funds.
Private suppliers of resources will naturally seek to price discriminate among their clients.
Deep pockets lead to higher prices for everything from cleaning services to medical supplies.
Health care provider organizations relying on public funds are not immune to purveyor
absorption of surplus. A government subsidizer may well cut the level of subsidy if a provider
is running a surplus (and oﬀer support through a soft budget constraint [Kornai 1986] in
hard times).10
Moreover, a provider’s employees can usurp part of any surplus. Some evidence comes
from the literature on unionization and collective bargaining. Unionized ﬁrms often have
lower proﬁts than comparable ﬁrms (with similar growth or capital-labor ratios), consistent
with a bargaining model in which unionization claims more of any given surplus for workers
(Clark 1984). Empirical analysis by Alexander and Bloom (1987) suggests that the practice
of collective bargaining in hospitals is more likely in “good times” (or “improving times”);
among government and nonproﬁt hospitals; and when regulatory intensity is high, with
associated pressures for institutional isomorphism.11 Pauly and Redisch (1973) characterize
nonproﬁt hospitals as physicians’ cooperatives, with commensurate ability to control resource
10For example, Duggan (2000) ﬁnds that local governments decreased their subsidies to public hospitals
almost exactly dollar-for-dollar with the increased California state revenues those hospitals received from
the Disproportionate Share (DSH) program payments for indigent patient care.
11In a seminal article on the sociology of organizations, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) argue that several
processes, including professionalization and bureaucratization, lead rational actors in any given ﬁeld to
“make their organizations increasingly similar as they try to change them” (p.147), resulting in institutional
isomorphism.
17ﬂow and retain surplus (or create organizational slack).
By contrast, when times are tight, employees may have to sacriﬁce. During the Depres-
sion, for example, hospital employees accepted large reductions in wages: “Nursing salaries
were cut across the board–largely without complaint.... Young doctors, like nurses, were
loath to leave the shelter of the hospital. Even though half of interns received no monthly
allowances from hospitals or any other form of pay in 1933, they did get food and lodging,
and house staﬀ positions were eagerly sought” (Stevens 1989, p.144).
Though we have posed this situation as one of surplus retention, it could also be posed
as one where the decision-maker is an agent for many parties — those who subsidize it, sell it
goods and services, and work for it. Yet, the decision-maker cannot extract the full rent from
providing those principals with beneﬁts. Moreover, it is assumed that the decision-maker
has little or no concern for the principals who also claim the surplus, as long as they are
fairly compensated. The one principal for which the provider-agent exhibits direct concern
is the patient: we assume that higher quality of care raises provider utility for any given
level of ﬁnancial reward.
We do not assume any speciﬁc ownership form, although direct concern for patient ben-
eﬁts is most often ascribed to nonproﬁt organizations.12 One important application might
be to the analysis and oversight of ownership conversions. It seems natural to consider
conversion to for-proﬁt ownership as an increase in the manager’s surplus retention rate,
compared to more diﬀuse ownership and surplus claims in government and nonproﬁt ﬁrms.
Then Proposition 1 suggests that conversions to for-proﬁt status are most likely to raise eﬃ-
12Hart and Holmstrom (2002) refer to manager “enthusiasts,” in the context of for-proﬁt ﬁrms.
18ciency and quality in hard times (when many conversions take place), but may lower quality
in ﬂush times. This suggests that study of conversions and their impact on quality should
take into account the reimbursement and competitive environment at the time of conversion,
and also examine performance several years after conversion or in a diﬀerent phase of the
business cycle.
Proposition 1 ﬁts well with a large literature on how competitive environments and
“hard times” spur productivity improvements and organizational innovation. Caves (1980)
notes that “economists’ vague suspicions that competition is the enemy of sloth can be
speciﬁcally documented in the eﬀect of competition (and environmental uncertainty) on
the decision-making structures and control devices of ﬁrms” (p.88). Caves and Krepps
(1993) ﬁnd that import competition and changes in control spurred large ﬁrms to lay oﬀ
nonproduction workers, and that those lay-oﬀs increased the value of the ﬁrm. Shareholders
reacted positively to announcements of corporate downsizing involving white-collar lay-oﬀs.
Within health care, Kessler and McClellan (2000) ﬁnd hospital competition to be socially
beneﬁcial–both reducing cost and improving quality in terms of patient outcomes–under re-
cent competitive environments. Although measuring health care productivity (and the value
of new medical technologies) presents a unique challenge (see Cutler and McClellan 2001),
some evidence points to organizational innovation in “hard times.” Anecdotally, providers
emphasize improving quality more in the early 21st century, when cost pressures are high
and margins low, than in the 1990s. It remains unclear to what extent this represents a
response to “hard times,” a response to recent prominent calls for quality improvement (e.g.,
the 2001 IOM report Crossing the Quality Chasm), or some combination.
19Proposition 2 — that an increase in productive eﬃciency always leads the provider to
increase quality — is a more conventional result. The key policy question becomes what poli-
cies can spur increases in productive eﬃciency? A frequently used motivation or reward for
such eﬃciency gains is an increase in the decision-maker’s claim to residual resources, pro-
viding another link to Proposition 1. Other commonly cited motivators include competition,
supply-side incentives, and ownership. We discuss each brieﬂyi nt u r n .
Health care policymakers in many countries seek to use incentives and competition to
spur eﬃciency improvements in the health sector. In fact, Cutler (2002) argues that pro-
moting incentives and competition constitutes a current “third wave” of international health
policy reform. A central concern that arises from increasing supply-side cost sharing is the
trade-oﬀ between incentives for productive eﬃciency and risk selection (Newhouse 1996).
Supply-side incentives, particularly when combined with competition for proﬁtable patients,
can exacerbate incentives for stinting on quality for unproﬁtable clients or for services dis-
proportionately used by the poor and uninsured (Ellis 1997; Frank, Glazer and McGuire
2000). Since our model does not look at patient heterogeneity, it throws little light upon the
uneven improvement in quality that may follow productive eﬃciency gains.
Finally, our second proposition suggests that if for-proﬁt organizations achieve greater
productive eﬃciency than other ownership forms, and if for-proﬁts also share the objective
function posited above, then for-proﬁt si m p r o v es o c i a lw e l f a r e .O fc o u r s ee v i d e n c ef o rh i g h e r
for-proﬁte ﬃciency in the health sector is mixed (Sloan 2000), and the assumption that
for-proﬁts have an innate or reputational concern for quality seems questionable.13
13Our propositions also relate to the large literature on executive compensation, stock and stock options
20Our attention to surplus retention stresses the breadth of agency relationships within the
health care sector. Vastly disparate classes of players have claims on a healthcare provider’s
surplus. In eﬀect, there is a decision-maker with the responsibilities of a residual claimant,
but not the privileges. He is forced to share any residual surplus. Yet, in an ironic “second-
best” twist, this claim sharing helps ameliorate another agency problem, stinting on quality.
Given this environment, the decision-maker’s concern for quality, a concern that is likely to
be reinforced by professional norms, can strongly bolster quality.14 This paper identiﬁes the
conditions where greater sharing of claims leads to greater, and lesser, quality.
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A Appendix: The Wealth Eﬀect is Positive
In this Appendix, we provide a brief argument for why the wealth eﬀe c to fa ni n c r e a s ei n
the surplus retention rate (identiﬁed in the discussion of Figure 2) must be positive. To
see why the wealth eﬀect must lead the provider to increase quality, let B =( qB,y B) and
C =( qC,y C), and consider Figure 3. Since s∗ (q) is a downward translation of b1s(q),
s∗0 (qB)=b1s0 (qB), and the constraints have the same slope at points B and D.O n t h e
other hand, quasilinear utility implies that utility isoquants are horizontal translations of
each other. Therefore the iso-utility curve through point D (labeled v3)h a st h es a m es l o p e
at point E as constraint y = b1s(q) has at point D, and therefore, by convexity of the
isoquants, point D cannot be an optimum. Further, we know (also by convexity) that
isoquant v3 is steeper than constraint b1s(q) at point D, and therefore that the solution to
the provider’s optimization problem when the constraint is y = b1s(q) must lie further to















Figure 3: The Wealth Eﬀect is Uniformly Positive.
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